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Abstract
Using a technology where pollution is regarded as by-product of industry's activ-
ity and applied in a simple setup of Heckscher-Ohlin-Copeland-Taylor model, this
paper analyses the possible distributional impacts of stricter environmental policy in
a developing country characterized by the presence of labor-intensive informal sector
which may not be a subject to the environmental regulation, and capital intensive
formal sector which may face minimum wage policy. The comparative static anal-
ysis illustrates that stricter environmental regulation if enforced uniformly accross
industries in undistorted labor market, hurts both labor and capital owner, leaving
income ditribution unchanged. On the contrary, when economy is dualistic, income
distribution may change due to labor reallocation. When the stricter regulation can
only be enforced in formal sector, capital owner will be worse-o while labor are
better-o. If initially capital reward is higher, the environmental policy will improve
income distribution in favor of labor. The change in income distribution is greater
when economy is dualistic.
1 Introduction
The huge protest following the government anouncement of gasoline subsidy cut in In-
donesia recently, shows one example of how policies may create winners and losers, and
if not taken seriously will also create additional costs to the economy such as social
unrest or political instability. Not many, especially in Indonesia, however, are aware
that gasoline subsidy cut is an example of environmental policies that in many devel-
oped countries, in the form of gasoline tax rise, is intended to reduce air pollution. In
Indonesia, on the other hand, the motivation of the policy is to reduce the burden on
the government budget as it contribute signicant share of public spending.
The strong public resistence of the gasoline subsidy cut in Indonesia interestingly had
attracted academic debate on whether or not the policy reduce poverty. Some argued
that because the share of gasoline consumption is higher for rich people, the policy
is progressive or income equalising. If combined with eective compensation of the
The Author would like to thanks Budy Resosudarmo, Raghbendra Jha, Philip Liu, and participants
of RSPAS Seminar Series, at ANU for comments and suggestion. The usual disclaimer applies. Address
for correspondence: arief.yusuf@anu.edu.au
1
additional fund saved from the subsidy cut, the policy at the end may reduce poverty
incidence. At the other side of the debate, however, some argued that the degree of
progressiveness may not be high enough and if combined with the ineectiveness of
the compensation schemethe policy may in fact increase the number of the poors1. It
is worth mentioning, however, that none of this debate talks about the benet of the
subsidy cut in the form of eciency gain from reduction in the policy distortion. As fuel
subsidy creates distorted relative price in the economy, the lower distortion will increase
economic eciency. Revealing to the market the true cost of gasoline also has long run
positive impact on the environment from energy substitution. In short, any economic
or environmental policy has gain or benet to be distributed and has loss or cost to be
distributed as well. The debate seems to focus only on one side of the story i.e. the cost
or who pay for the policy.
It is very natural that environmental policy must have distributional impact. Because
the essential purpose of environmental policy is to change consumptions and produc-
tion patterns. Therefore it is inevitable that there will be winners and losers among
households and rms (Kristorm, 2003). Environmental economics literature, however,
focus mainly on eciency as a consequence of treating environmental problems as ex-
ternality, a departure from pareto optimum2. To ll this gap, it is then important that
studies on environmental policies analyze how to pursue not only ecient but also fair
environmental policies.
Complete picture of the distributional impact of environmental policies has to con-
sider two distinct issues (OECD, 2004). The two inseparable issues are rstly, the
concerns related to the distribution of environmental quality and, secondly, those as-
sociated to the distribution of nancial eects of environmental policies. As discussed
previously, the rst covers the distribution of benet i.e. the question on who gain more
and who gain less, while the second covers the distribution of costs i.e. who pay more
and who pay less. Distribution of environmental quality focus for example on disparities
in access to environmental goods, how provision of environmentally related public ser-
vices such as water access will be distributed, and the heterogeneity in the exposure to
environmental bads such as pollution or environmental hazards. Distribution of nancial
eects, on the other hands refers to the fact that the implementation of environmental
policies can be socially regressive, that is, lower-income groups may be subject to a
disproportionately higher share of environmental compliance costs. This second aspect
actually can be divided into how the environmental policy aect the income side and
expenditure side of the households. The topic of this paper is on the income side i.e. how
environmental policies may change distribution of income. The more complete studies
need also to cover how the environmental policies may eect expenditure pattern, and
this is planned to be studied in the research thesis that will be pursued by the author
1Source: Selected articles from Kompas daily newspaper.
2The highly regarded text on environmental policy from Baumol and Oates (1988) contains mainly
the theory of externalities.
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using more complete Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model for Indonesia.
The objective of this paper is to see the possible distributional impacts of stricter
environmental policy in a developing country characterized by the presence of informal
sector which may not be a subject to the environmental regulation on the one hand, and
formal sector which may be a subject to minimum wage policy on the other hand. More
generally in the context of the research thesis that the author would like to pursue on
the distributional impact of environmental policies in Indonesia, this simple analytical
exercise is hoped to give preliminary lessons learned on what need to be accounted for
before developing a more complete and bigger CGE model.
Later in this introduction, short review of relevant literature will be briey discussed,
while the rest of the paper will be organized as follow. Section 2 discuss the setup of the
model especially the assumption of the technology representation of the industries while
section 3 assess in a comparative static analysis the factorial distributional impact of
stricter environmental regulation using the model. Section 4 applies the model in a hy-
pothetical numerical example to give clearer illustration how the stricter environmental
regulation may aect income distribution. In section 5 lessons learned from this exercise
in the context of the author's research proposal will be discussed and concluded.
The comparative static analysis using this very simple model illustrates that stricter
environmental regulation if enforced uniformly accross industries in undistorted labor
market, hurts both labor and capital owner, leaving income ditribution unchanged.
When economy is dualistic, however, the consequently better environmental quality has
slightly dierent distributional eect. Although price of capital and wage in the informal
sector fall, labor who manage to still work in the formal sector will be protected from
being worse-o. However, some labor could not stay in the formal sector and has to move
to informal sector, earning lower wage. In the hypothetical simulation, it is conrmed
that contrary to the case where economy is not dualistic, uniform stricter regulation
change distribution of income.
When stricter environmental regulation can only be enforced in formal sector, as
formal sector is plausibly assumed to be capital intensive, whether or not the economy
is dualistic, capital owner will be the only one who will pay for the better environmental
quality. However, since, informal sector activity expand, the distributional impact may
also depend on the labor reallocation from formal to informal sector. Hypothetical
example illustrates that in this case, the change in income distribution, which is in favor
of labor, is greater when economy is dualistic.
Overall, this simple exercise using this highly simplied model ilustrate some cases
where stricter environmental regulation may not have adverse distributional impact. The
simplicity of this model such as the highly restrictive assumption embodied in Heckscher-
Ohlin-Samuelson setting, which for example, is strictly long-run, assume closed capital
account and disregarding the fact that informal sector commoditiy may not be fully
tradable is not intended to give general prediction. It does however leave some lessons
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learned before we go to a more complete model that need to be developed for further
research in the thesis that the author would like to pursue for studying the distributional
impact of environmental policies in Indonesia using much bigger CGE model. It stress for
example the importance of the information on the size and factor intensity of formal and
informal sector, the range of eectiveness of environmental regulation, the abatement
technology accross industries, and the initial distribution of income.
The amandement of Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model incorporating minimum wage
policy, wage rigidity, or dierentiated factor prices is not new. Jones (1971) for example
analyzed the impact of distortion in labor market in the form of wage premium in one
sector on the income distribution. The others that include explicitly minimum wage for
example Johnson (1969) McCulloh (1974), and Neary (1985). A very comprehensive
review on factor market distortion, production, and trade was written by Magee (1973).
Imam and Whalley (1985) in particular explored the incidence of a sector specic min-
imum wage in dualistic setting of Hariss-Todaro model. More recently Kar and Marjit
(2001) demonstrates the welfare eects of trade policy reforms in a general equilibrium
framework, in the presence of an informal sector in the economy. A few however analyze
the impact of environmental policy in a dualistic economy.
Some of the few that analyzed the impact of environmental policies in a dualistic
labor market are among others Chao et al (2000), Daitoh (2003), and Dean and Gan-
gopadhyay (1997). Chao et al (2000) develops a general equilibrium model to examine
the optimal level of environmental preservation in terms of its costs and benets for a
closed and open economy. In an economy consisting of two main activities: farming
and processing but use three dierent input (labor, land, and raw material), Chao et
al (2000) atempted to nd the optimal environmental preservation and its impact on
sectoral unemployment and trade in resources. In the model it is assumed that there is
an institutionaly set urban wage that is higher than the market clearing level.
Daitoh (2003) on the other hand, explored sucient conditions for the welfare-
improving environmental policy reform in the Harris{Todaro economy. This paper
investigates how a stricter environmental protection policy in the urban manufactur-
ing may aect the manufacturing employment and urban unemployment, and explores
the sucient conditions for welfare improvement. Daitoh (2003) concluded that a rise
in the pollution tax rate in the urban manufacturing has spillover eects on the two la-
bor market distortions: the less-than-optimal manufacturing employment and the urban
unemployment.
Dean and Gangopadhyay (1997) examined the eects of an export ban on interme-
diate goods in a three-sector model in which the production of intermediates gives rise
to environmental damage. They consider primarily how the (second-best) optimal pro-
duction and export taxes should be set in the presence of urban unemployment. They
consider policy reform as well, making it clear that the export ban aggravates urban
unemployment in the short run, but decreases it in the long run.
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Compared to the paper described previously, this paper has dierent emphasis. In
the context of the thesis-topic that the author is working on, the focus will be more
on the distributional impact of environmental policies, where here, in this paper, for
simplication, is represented by the factorial distribution of income. In contrasts to those
papers, this paper assume full employment of both capital and labor, that emphasize the
long-run nature of the model, and to make consistent with the simple Heckscher-Ohlin
model used as a basic starting point. The assumption of full-employment or voluntary
unemployment is used by most of the CGE model that mainly reect the equilibrium of
the economy (OECD, 2003). In the context of developing countries, especially Indonesia,
where open unemployment is always reported to be very low the full employment may
reect the dualistic nature of the economy. When formal sector can not absorb the
excess supply of labor, informal sector may become the runaway place, where labor can
get much lower wages and also work with minimum hours.
2 The Model
This model is a simple extension to Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) 2-goods, 2-factors
model, which is standard in international trade literature. Therefore most of the assump-
tion embodied in HOS model will be retained. The economy is assumed to be small in
a sense that it can not aect exogenous international price, goods are freely mobile
across countries but factors are not. Factor of production, however, can move between
industries. Economy is assumed to be always in full employment which emphasize the
long-run nature of this model. Throughout the analysis it will be assumed that economy
never fully specialized. The extension to this simple HOS model is via the introduc-
tion of pollution, as a joint product of rm's activity. Considering the focus will be
on developing economies, this model will be applied in a dualistic labor market setting
where industries may face dierent wages, one of which is exogenously determined by
government employment policy. However, we will still consider the case of undistorted
labor market to make comparison.
2.1 Production and Abatement Technology
Suppose that the economy consist of two sectors or industries, i.e. formal sector (F )
and and informal sector (I). Adapting the technological structure used in Copeland and
Taylor (2003, 1997), the production structure of the industries are
xi = (1  i) gi (Li;Ki) (1)
zi = 'i (i) gi (Li;Ki) (2)
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where i = F; I. Sector i, jointly produce two output i.e. commodity xi and emissions
zi:
3 The amount of emission produced depends on the level of abatement activity of the
rms. We may interpret gi as potential output i.e. the amount of xi to be produced if
no abatement activity take place. gi() is increasing, concave, and linearly homogeneous,
0  i  1, '(0) = 1; '(1) = 0; and d'idi < 0: Industry i endogenously decide how much
from every unit of its potential output will be allocated to the production of xi (or
1   i) and how much will be diverted to abatement activity (i). 'i (i) captures the
transformation between potential output and emission taking into account the abate-
ment activity. For analytical convenience, following Copeland and Taylor (2003), it is
assumed that 'i (i) follow
'i (i) = (1  i)1=i (3)
where 0 < i < 1 represent the parameter of abatement technology. By imposing this
special functional form, in addition to representing emission as output of the production
process, pollution can also be treated as input to produce xi; such that
xi = z
i
i [gi (Ki; Li)]
1 i (4)
Because equation (4) is Cobb-Douglass, i then may represent the cost share pollu-
tion to produce xi.
2.2 Cost Minimization and Endogenous Emission Intensity
The separability of equation (4) make it possible to break the rm's problem into two
stage that is, rstly minimizing the cost of producing potential output gi(), and then
nding the most ecient way to combine g() and pollution (zi) to produce net output
or commodities xi. In the rst stage rm minimize cost given technology of produc-
ing potential output. We can write the unit labor and capital demand from this cost
minimization as
(li; ki) = arg min
Li;Ki
fwiLi + rKi : g (Li;Ki) = 1g (5)
where li and ki are unit labor and capital demand, wi is price of labor faced by rm i,
and r is rental rate or price of capital. It is assumed that wF is a minimum wage that is
higher that would have been in a competitive undistorted labor market set exogenously
by government. Wage in informal sector, however, is endogenously determined in the
labor market. From this rst stage of cost minimization, rms now know how much
the minimum unit cost to produce every unit of potential output. This is denoted by
cgi = wili + rki:
3Here, there is no distinction between clean and dirty industry as formal and informal sector also
produce pollution. Copeland and Taylor (2003) distinguishes between clean and dirty sector, in order
to discuss the trade pattern and comparative advantage change after a trade reform.
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Having known the unit cost of producing potential output, in the second stage of
the optimization, rms minimize cost of producing good xi (or net output in contrast
to potential output) by choosing the optimal level of potential output and amount of
emission. The price of emission are the emission tax ( i)
4 set by environmental regulator.
The unit cost of producing net output, then is
cxi = minzi;gi
n
 izi + c
g
i gi : z
i
i g
1 i
i = 1
o
(6)
First order condition of the optimization problem in equation (6) can be written as
zi
gi
1 i
i
=
cgi
 i
: Linear homogeneity of xi() also implies pixi = cgi gi+ izi: Combining these
two equations, we can then solve for emission intensity i.e.
ei =
zi
xi
=
ipi
 i
 1: (7)
As discussed in Copeland and Taylor (2003), it will be assumed that zi  xi to ensure
the optimum emission will be an interior solution. Equation (7) has a very straightfor-
ward intuition. Emission intensity, here is endogenously determined and depend on three
factors. First, the abatement technology represented by i: If for example, the rm has
low abatement technology, then i i.e. the share of emission input cost will be high, and
emission intensity will be higher. Secondly, the higher the commodity price, the higher
the emission intensity. Commodity price can be interpreted as the opportunity cost of
doing abatement activity. If the cost is high, rm will prefer to produce more net output
to be sold in market place although they may pollute more and pay tax. Thirdly, the
price of emission that has to be paid to the regulator for every pollution emitted by the
rm ( i).
After we know the emission intensity, total emission in each sector then can be calcu-
lated as zi = eixi:It may also be noted that, although the total emission of the industry
depend on xi, which is endogenously determined in the model, emission intensity, how-
ever depend only on exogenous factors. Once we know the market price, which will be
also equal to international commodity price without distortionary trade policy, given the
rm's abatement technology, and unit emission tax, set by the regulator, then we may
calculate the amount of pollution produced by the rm for every unit output it produce.
Despite its simplicity, this contribution by Copeland and Taylor (2003), however, goes
beyond many applied general equilibrium analysis where pollution is only determined
by technology disregarding the incentive mechanism that may drive the rm's decision
on how much they will pollute.
If we substitute zi = eixi into equation (4) we can have e
i=(1 i)
i = (1  i), and
if combined with equation (7), we can obtain an expression for i in terms of output
4Here, we allow the possibility of policy variable dierentiation by regulator to each industry. This
will be discussed further in the section on comparative static analysis.
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price and environmental policy variable that is
i = 1 

ipi
 i
i=(1 i)
: (8)
Share of resources allocated for abatement activity than increase as the pollution
tax increase, and falls as the price (the opportunity cost of abatement) rise.
2.3 General Equilibrium Factor Price and Allocation
The gross revenue that the rm earn from selling commodity xi is pixi; while its total
cost include factor cost and total emission tax paid or wiLi + rKi +  izi. Competitive
free entry condition implies pixi = wiLi + rKi +  izi: As i is cost share of emission,
we know that  izi = ipixi and can be substituted to have (1  i) pixi = wiLi + rKi:
Recalling that xi = (1  i) gi; we can then write the zero prot condition for both rms
as written in the rst two of the following equation system,
wF lF + rkF = pF (1  F ) (1  F ) (9)
wI lI + rkI = pI (1  I) (1  I) (10)
lF gF + lIgI = L (11)
kF gF + kIgI = K: (12)
where lF ; kF ; lI ; kI are unit factor demands as dened in equation (5) and also it should
be noted that those factors demand can be written as a function of factor prices. The
rst two equations says that the unit cost of producing potential output (cgi ) or the
total unit factor payment made by the rm has to be equal to the "eective" price
(which we will later denote by qi) of the potential output received by the rm.
5 The
eective or producer's price is less than the commodity price because a portion of i has
to be used for abatement activity and i has to be used to pay emission tax. The last
two equations are endowment constraint which says that the total allocation of factors
between sectors has to be added up to total factor endowment in the economy. The
rst two equations will determine the factor prices in the economy, and the last two
equations will complete the general equilibrium of the supply side i.e. potential output,
net output, and emission, of both industries.
3 Comparative Static: Who Pay for the Cleaner Air?
A complete picture of distributional impact of environmental policy has to take into
account inseparately two important aspect i.e. how the benet of environmental policy
5Alternative expression of the equations will be in term of unit cost of producing net output i.e.
cxi = pi (1  i) ; but cxi = c
g
i
1 i : See Copeland and Taylor (2003) for more discussion.
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is distributed, and who pay the cost of taking that policy. There are vast amount
analysis of the second aspect of the distributional issues but few discuss the former.
The fact that to assess the benet of environmental policy requires calculation of non-
marketted commodities such as clean air or aesthetic values are the main reasons. The
distributional cost of environmental policy, however, has to consider two dierent side of
story. First, is the nancing aspect of that distribution that is how households income
will be aected by the policy, and secondly how the policy will change the expenditure
pattern across household. This paper is not intended to give complete coverage of the
story, but only trying to capture the rst.
The setup of the model laid down in the previous section will be used to assess
the factorial distributional impact of a stricter environmental policy. Before the policy
change it will be assumed that a lower degree of environmental regulation has already
taking place, that is at the initial condition we have already F =  I =  > 0: The new
policy will be in the form of the higher emission tax. For the purpose of comparative
static analysis, we will work on the percentage form because it is more handy for algebraic
manipulation. The example of analysis using the percentage change of this form can be
seen in in Jones (1965) or Kar and Marjit (2001) for more recent paper. We can totally
dierentiate the equation system (9) to (12) and present it in percentage change as
LF w^F + KF r^ = q^F  

LF l^F + KF k^F

(13)
LIw^I + KI r^ = q^I  

LI l^I + KI k^I

(14)
LF g^F + LI g^I = L^ 

LF l^F + LI l^I

(15)
KF g^F + KI g^I = K^  

KF k^F + KI k^I

(16)
where hat over a variable indicate its percentage change, Li =
wili
qi
and Ki =
rki
qi
are
the labor cost share and capital cost share, respectively, in producing potential output
while Li =
ligi
L and Ki =
kigi
K are the share of factor employed in each industry. The
eective price of potential output is qi = pi (1  i) (1  i). Recalling that i is as
dened in equation (8). The percentage change in qi can be written as q^i =   i1 i ^ i =
 i^ i, as we will assume that pi and i will not change in our comparative static analysis.
i can be interpreted as elasticity of producer's price with respect to emission tax. If i
is higher representing lower abatement technology or higher cost share of pollution in
the cost of xi production, for every percentage increase in the emission tax rate, given
the price of xi; the more the fall in the unit revenue the rm receive for every potential
output they produce.
As wili + rki is the minimum cost of producing one unit of gi, that is the result of
rm choosing input minimizing cost given factor price, there no alternative combination
of capital and labor that will yield lower unit cost. Firms vary li and ki to set the
derivative of unit costs equal to zero. Alteration in factor proportion must balance out
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such that the -weighted average of the change in unit factor demand in each industry
is zero. Therefore, it can be shown that LF l^F +KF k^F = 0, and LI l^I +KI k^I = 0:
6:
The system of equations then, can be written as
LF w^F + KF r^ =  F ^F (17)
LIw^I + KI r^ =  I ^ I (18)
LF g^F + LI g^I = F (w^F   r^) + I (w^I   r^) (19)
KF g^F + KI g^I =  !F (w^F   r^)  !I (w^I   r^) (20)
where F = LFKFF ; I = LIKII ; !F = KFLFF ; !I = KILII ;and we
assume that there is no change in factor endowment, therefore K^ = L^ = 0.
For example, if we want to analyze the eect of stricter environmental regulation
in the form of increase in emission tax, then, the rst two equations will determine
the change in the factor prices. Those solved change in the factor price then could
be substituted to the last two equations to nd out how the factor are reallocated
between industries, as well as the change in output and emission. The following four
setting or scenario will be considered. Firstly, the higher emission tax will be eectively
forced both in formal and informal sectors (full compliance case). This will be analyzed
under assumption of undistorted labor market that is both sectors face the same factor
price. In the second scenario, the case where full compliance can not be achieved will
be considered. The higher emission tax will eectively be enforced in formal sector
only. This situation more resemble the case in developing countries where regulator
have limited resource to enforce and assess how much pollution are emitted by informal
sectors. The third and fourth scenario will follow the rst and the second one but under
a setting of dualistic economy.
Before further discussion, the terms full and partial compliance need to be claried.
One of the purpose of the analysis that follows is to see the distributional impact of
stricter environmental regulation where in some of the cases, this stricter regulation
can only eectively be applied in formal sector. This scenario is merely an attempt to
picture the plausible representation of a situation in developing countries where informal
sector is spatially scattered, small in rm size, hence dicult to monitor. Because we
assume that initially, a lower (or we could say minimum level) of emission tax has already
been applied in both sector, a higher emission tax only to formal sector will make the
nal level of emission tax is dierentiated. Some will argue that it just a dierentiated
tax rate, unrelated to compliance. The term compliance is usually more referred to a
situation where a rm decide not to comply to regulation, in this case it may be evading
the tax (emission tax evasion) or under-reporting the true emission.
However, it need to be emphasized that the main and most sensible reason that
stricter environmental regulation can not be applied in informal sector is related to
6See Jones (1965) for detail.
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compliance. The question is whether we can represent this compliance problem with
lower emission tax rate. It would be argued that we can. From the regulator's per-
spective, given a certain emission tax in the informal sector, if the emission reported
is less than the actual emission, then the tax revenue received is as if the tax rate for
the actual emission is lower. This is not sucient however, as rms also need to see
that their "eective" emission tax rate is lower, as we are concerned with the behavior
of rms not regulator. The following argument is an attempt to show that in certain
cases, rms that do not comply fully to the regulation may be seen as those who see an
eective tax rate lower than the formal emission tax rate set by regulator.
Now, suppose that in the informal sector, I is the amount of emission reported
(subject to emission tax rate  I) which is less than the true emission zI . It is possible
however, that regulator may discover the dishonesty of the rm and a penalty of  may
be imposed. Suppose that the penalty is increasing in the amount of under-reporting or
 (zI   vI), where 0 > 0; 00 > 0. The probability of being discovered of under-reporting
is  (I) which is assumed to be a function reported emission. Regulatory agent may
know the expected true emission given, for example, characteristic of the rm, so the
greater the amount of emission reported the less probability of being discovered or
0 < 0. In this uncertainty, the rm prot will be either 1 = pIxI (zI ; gI)  cgIgI    II ,
with probability (1  ) or 0 = pIxI (zI ; gI) cgIgI  IzI  (zI   I), with probability
. The rm maximizes expected prot that will yield the following rst order condition
pI
@xI
@gI
= cgI (21)
pI
@xI
@zI
= 
 
 I + 
0 (22)
 I + 
0 ( I (zI   vI) + ) = 
 
 I + 
0 (23)
Combining the last two equations we can have
pI
@xI
@zI
=  I + 
0  1   0 <  I : (24)
This equation says that marginal value product of emission has to be equal to the cost
or price of the emission or the "eective" emission tax which is less than the tax rate
set by regulator. Because the marginal product of emission or @xI@zI is decreasing with
level of emission, the optimal emission under this uncertainty case will be higher than
the full compliance. The net eect of the tax rate is as if it is a lower tax but with full
compliance. Therefore, In the analysis that follow, it may be argued that the partial
compliance scenorio may be represented by ^ I = 0 and ^F > 0:
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3.1 Case 1: Full Compliance, Undistorted Labor Market
Because, now labor market is undistorted, both sector use the same abatement technol-
ogy, and are subject to uniform emission tax, the system of equation determining factor
prices are given as
LF w^ + KF r^ =  ^ (25)
LIw^ + KI r^ =  ^ (26)
It is easy to see that in this special case,
w^ = r^ =  ^ < 0 (27)
Because we can interpret pollution as input to production of xi together with labor
and capital, bundled in one single factor i.e. potential output , for every increase in the
price of pollution (emission tax), at any given output (commodities) to be produced,
rms will try to use less of pollution, and more of potential output. Because marginal
productivity of input is declining with the use of that input, marginal productivity
of potential output and its price must fall. Price of capital and labor then will fall
proportionately. The homogeneity of the x production function and the separability of
this production function with potential output g production function make this possible.
Labor and capital owner loose, and the owner of the pollution will gain which here is
represented by regulator who can set exogenously the price they want to receive for
every clean air to be polluted. As we do not discuss the demand side of the pollution,
because the concern are more of the distributional cost of environmental regulation, we
will not say more of the welfare optimum or endogenous emission tax.
As w^ = r^; w=r does not change, hence there is no change in factor intensity in both
sector, and potential output stays the same, no factor reallocation between industries
take place. However, as emission intensity across the economy decline as a result of
higher emission tax, pollution will decline together with reduction in the production of
commodity.
3.2 Case 2: Partial Compliance, Undistorted Labor Market
When higher emission tax can only be eectively enforced in formal sector only, we may
represent it with ^F = ^ > 0 and ^ I = 0: The zero prot condition then become,
LF w^ + KF r^ =  ^ (28)
LIw^ + KI r^ = 0: (29)
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The percentage change in factor prices are,
w^ =
1  LI
LI   LF ^ > 0 (30)
r^ =   LI
LI   LF ^ < 0 (31)
as we assume that informal sector is labor intensive, while formal sector is capital in-
tensive.
In the case where compliance of stricter environmental regulation is only in formal
sector, labor owner will be better-o and capital owner will be worse-o. As the policy
change work through the change in producer's price i.e. the net revenue per unit of
sales of commodity has been reduced because of higher emission tax, the price of input
used intensively in formal sector will fall, and price of input used intensively in the
non-compliance informal sector will rise. This is, actually, the standard mechanics of
Stolper-Samuelson eect that work under Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson small open econ-
omy setting. Given full-employment assumption, it can be shown that because both
sector will use more capital for every labor they used or factor intensity will decline
in both sector, formal sector output will contract, and informal sector output will ex-
pand. The factor-reallocation that take place, however, does not change the factorial
distribution of income, because in this case, it does not matter in which industry factors
are employed. However to see precisely, we can use the factor endowment constraint in
equation (19) and (20) to nd the change in potential output in both sector as
g^F =
(KF   1)A1 + (1  LF )A2
KF   LF < 0 (32)
g^I =
KFA1   LFA2
KF   LF > 0 (33)
where A1 =
(F+I)^
LI LF > 0, A2 =  
(!F+!I)^
LI LF < 0, and assuming that because informal
sector is labor intensive, KF   LF > 0. Hence, it is conrmed that activity in formal
sector will contract while activity in the informal sector will expand, accompanied by
increase in the price of factor that is used intensively in this sector i.e. labor. As
l^F =  KFF (w^   r^) < 0, then L^F = l^F + g^F < 0 and L^I > 0: There is some labor
that moves from formal to to informal sector. In this case, where there is not dierence
in wages between both sectors, this will not change the distributional story, but it is not
the case when labor market is distorted as in the next cases.
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3.3 Case 3: Full Compliance, Dualistic Economy
The zero prot condition in the case where the stricter regulation can be enforced
eectively in both sectors in a dualistic can be written as,
KF r^ =  ^ (34)
LIw^I + KI r^ =  ^ (35)
To recall, we assumed that wF is exogenous, and now it does not change, and wI is
determined to clear the labor market in formal sector. The change in the factor prices
then can be given as
w^F = 0 (36)
w^I =
1
LI
LF   LI
1  LF ^ < 0 (37)
r^ =   1
1  LF ^ < 0 (38)
We can see that while labor in the formal sector does not change because protected
by minimum wage policy, wage in informal sector and price of capital fall. Complete
distributional impact for dualistic setting, however, has to consider factor reallocation.
As in formal sector wage is xed and rental rate falls, formal sector become more capital
intensive. We need to compare the magnitude in the change in the factor price in the
informal sector. As w^I 6= r^, factor intensity in informal sector change. The percentage
change in capital labor ratio is given by I
LF+(1 LI)
1 LF ^ > 0, where I is elasticity
of substitution in informal sector. Therefore informal sector also become more capital
intensive. When both sector become more capital intensive but informal sector is still
more labor intensive, activity in the formal sector will contract and activity in the
informal sector will expand. More precisely the change in the activity in both sector
can be found using the factor endowment constraints as follow
g^F =
(KF   1)B1 + (1  LF )B2
KF   LF < 0 (39)
g^I =
KFB1   LFB2
KF   LF > 0 (40)
where B1 =
ILF+LIF
LI
^
1 LF > 0, and B2 =  
!ILF+LI!F
LI
^
1 LF < 0: This result
is interesting, because compared to case 1, although stricter environmental regulation
is eectively and uniformly enforced in both sector, there is one industry i.e. informal
sector which expand their activity, while formal sector contract. Intuitively, it merely
reect the wage rigidity faced by formal sector. As price of capital fall, but wage is given
capital requirement in the formal sector will intensify. This also happen in the informal
sector, but because wage is exible there, the capital intensication is not as severe as
in the formal sector. Informal sector can absorb the excess supply of labor, while formal
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sector can't. Activity in the informal sector will expand.
The terms activity, here, is important, because it does not necessarily reect output
in terms of commodity, it only reect potential commodity and emission to be produced.
Activity may increase in one sector but only to reduce pollution. However, as far as
distribution are concerned, we can say that there will be a transfer of inputs from formal
to informal sector.
From distributional point of view, there will be new groups of labor that initially
work in the formal sector transferred to the informal sector and will be worse-o, as they
earn lower wages than would have been received in the formal sector. Whether or not
the eect of this stricter environmental regulation is progressive (income-equalizing) or
regressive remains to be analyzed further and depend on initial distribution of income.
This will be discussed in illustrative numerical example in section 4.
3.4 Case 4: Partial Compliance, Dualistic Economy
When compliance is only partial i.e. ^F =  > 0, ^ I = 0, the change in zero prot
condition in the formal and informal sector respectively will be
KF r^ =  ^ (41)
LIw^I + KI r^ = 0: (42)
The percentage change in factor prices will be
w^F = 0 (43)
w^I =
1  LI
LI (1  LF )^ > 0 (44)
r^ =   1
1  LF ^ < 0 (45)
Although we have the same eect with case 2, where wage rise and rental rate fall,
here, the sign in the change of factor rewards, interestingly does not depend on factor
intensity, hence even if informal sector is not labor intensive, in a dualistic setting, labor
in informal sector will always be better o, and those who managed to stay in formal
sector will be protected from income change. Here, eventhough, the factor market is
distorted, the Stolper-Samuelson eect still take place, factor that used intensively in
informal sector will be better o.
To nd out precisely how the factor will be redistributed following this environmental
policy shock, we can write the change in potential output in both sector as
g^F =
(KF   1)C1 + (1  LF )C2
KF   LF < 0 (46)
g^I =
KFC1   LFC2
KF   LF > 0 (47)
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where C1 =
1+LIF
LI
^
1 LF > 0, and C2 =  
!I+LI!F
LI
^
1 LF < 0. As both sectors
become more capital intensive than before, hence activity in the formal sector will
contract, and activity in the informal sector will expand, there will be labor reallocation
from formal sector to informal sector, that may change the distributional story.
4 Hypothetical Illustrative Example
The comparative static analysis discussed previously, conclude that in stricter environ-
mental regulation that can be enforced uniformly across industries in an undistorted
labor market will hurt both labor and capital owner, in addition to the lower produc-
tion of commodities. Similar thing happen when labor market is dualistic, but labor
who manage to still work in the formal sector will be protected from being worse-o.
In addition to that, however, some labor could not stay in the formal sector, that may
have eect on the overall distribution of income.
When stricter environmental regulation can only be enforced in formal sector, whether
or not the economy is dualistic, capital owner will be the only one who pay for the cleaner
air. This is simply because, formal sector is assumed to be capital intensive. However,
since, informal sector activity expand, the distributional impact may also depend the
factor reallocation from formal and informal sector. Therefore, whether or not the envi-
ronmental policy is regressive or progressive depend on the initial income distribution,
and also the change not only in the income gap between capital owner and labor, but
also between formal and informal labor. To make the story more intuitive in terms of
the impact on income distribution, the following discussion will analyze the hypotheti-
cal developing economy to see what may happen to the economy especially the income
distribution after the stricter environmental policy is implemented.
It is assumed that production function of potential output is Cobb-Douglass such
that gF = L

FK
1 
F , and gI = L
1 
I K

I , and  = :25 that reect that informal sector
is much labor intensive relative to formal sector. This reects mostly the situation in
developing economies. The economy is assumed to be relatively labor abundant such
that L = 30 and K = 20. Parameter of abatement technology is assumed to be the same
i.e.  = 0:01 and the initial emission tax that is applied in both sector is F =  I = 0:01.
The price of commodities produced by formal sector is assumed to higher than those
produced by informal sector, which is more plausible in most developing countries. Here
price of commodities of formal sector is assumed to be 50% higher. This will make the
initial distribution of income is in favor of capital, as wage will be roughly half of the
rental rate.
For clearer distributional illustration it may be assumed that the economy consist
of 50 households each of which own either labor or capital7. This factor endowment
7In some cases, it may be more relevant to interpreted labor as unskilled labor and capital as skilled
labor or human capital.
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is assumed to be continuous. This simplication make possible to construct index of
income distribution such as Gini Index which will be equal to zero if the share of income
earned by a certain group of households (formal labor, informal labor, or capital owner)
is equal to their share in the population.
Four cases that are discussed in the previous section are considered to see the eect
of increasing emission tax by from 0:01 to 0:015 (50%):The result of this simulation can
be seen from table 1.
<<Insert Table 1>>
As can be seen from table 1, stricter environmental regulation has reduced pollution
at the cost of overall output (GDP) and income in all cases. The reduction in pollution
is greater when the stricter regulation can be enforced in both sectors. With regard to
the distributional cost of this cleaner environment, we can see that in the case where the
regulation can be enforced to the whole economy, both factor rewards fall proportionally
at the same rate, and it does not change overall distribution of income. Inequality index
stay at 0.102. When stricter regulation can only be enforced in formal sector, pollution
only fall in the formal sectors, as output of the informal sector expand, even with
constant emission intensity, pollution from informal sector still rises, although aggregate
pollution drop. As initially, rental rate is higher than wage, and wage rises while rental
rate fall, income distribution improve. Gini index drop to 0.098.
Now, we suppose that before stricter environmental regulation take place, govern-
ment set a minimum wage policy to protect labor in formal sector to be 50% higher than
the otherwise competitive wage rate. Although not related to environmental policy, it
may be worth discussing the impact of this policy to the initial economy. The minimum
wage policy reduce overall output because of the ineciency in production. As both
sectors no longer face the same marginal rate of substitution, economy experience ine-
ciency in production, and can be represented by equilibrium production down below the
production possibility frontier. Capital owner denitely worse-o, as at any given out-
put, higher capital requirement must be accompanied by falling marginal productivity
of capital and rental rate. As capital market always in equilibrium and capital account
is closed i.e. capital outow is not possible in this model, minimum wage policy is bad
for capital owner.
Wage in informal sector, however, rise slightly. This is quite dierent with familiar
notion in the labor economics literature, where in the partial equilibrium analysis, higher
minimum wage in the formal sector will make wage in labor intensive informal sector
fall. However, we have to keep in mind that partial equilibrium analysis assumes ceteris
paribus, for example, the labor demand curve in informal sector does not shift, as capital
and output in the industry stays constant. In this general equilibrium setting, In the
informal sector, the drop in rental rate will increase capital demand and labor demand
will fall, marginal productivity of labor and wage rise. This result is not new, as it
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has been conrmed in the trade literature. Johnson (1969) for example stated that in
certain case, minimum wage that apply to only part of productive economy may benet
workers in all sectors. Jones (1971) also concluded that minimum wage that is applied
in an industry in which labor receive the smaller distributive share (capital intensive
sector) must rise the wage rate in both industries. Therefore, it can explain that if the
minimum wage policy is intended to improve income distribution, it works. Gini Index
has greatly fall from 0.102 to 0.059. However, it is worth stressing that this improving
distribution of income is at the cost of economy overall.
In contrast to the case when labor market is undistored, stricter environmental reg-
ulation if can be enforced to overall industries now change income distribution although
both wage and rental rate fall. Gini index fall from 0.059 to 0.058. This is because
there is some labor movement from formal to informal sector and those labor received
lower wage than before. Those who pay the most for the better environmental quality
is actually those few of labors that can not stay employed in the formal sector follow-
ing contraction in this industry after the stricter environmental regulation. However,
although activity in the informal sector expand, their production of commodity and pol-
lution still fall. In the case when stricter regulation can only be enforced in formal sector,
the income distribution improve slightly even more mainly because more of labor are
absorbed from formal sector into informal sectors. Now however, informal commodities
also rise as well as pollution from informal sector activity.
5 Lessons Learned for Further Research and Concluding
Remarks
The result from the simple exercise in this paper may provide some important lessons
when we are going to analyze the distributional impact of environmental policy in In-
donesia or developing countries in general. As far as the distribution of factor returns as
concern, the discussion shows how labor market distortion play crucial role as the distri-
butional impact of environmental regulation are signicantly dierent between the case
of dualistic or undistorted labor market. Therefore, study using more realistic model,
need to take into account this aspect. We need to know, for example, the information on
the degree of the distortion i.e. the gap between minimum wage and competitive wage
as well as the eectiveness of the enforcement of this labor regulation. Do all formal
sectors comply to this minimum wage policy?
The other important thing the accurate information on the size of the informal
sectors in terms of value added, output, and input absorption. This is very crucial in
terms of distributional issues. Informal sector may be small in value added compared
to formal sector, but it may absorb quite a lot of unskilled labor. This is important
not only to conrm that informal sector is really labor intensive, but also to know by
how much. This is the information that we need to nd for further study because this
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paper suggest that this is the key that drive the result. In the process, we also may ask
whether we can relax how we dene informal sector. Can we characterize a subset of
industries that will not eectively comply with stricter environmental regulation? Can
we conrm that those industries are labor intensive and not subject to minimum wage
policy? Size of industry can be a good candidate for making such distinction, but in
short, this issue need to be carefully studied.
To step into more general realistic model we may start by relaxing the crucial as-
sumptions and setup used in this simple exercise. Is emission tax relevant instrument
in Indonesia, because it necessarily does not exist?. Detail study on the environmental
regulation in Indonesia needs to be carried out to be able to nd more representative of
policy instruments. Even though simulation does not need necessarily represent reality,
the likelihood that the policy shock may become possible real policy options will improve
the relevance of the study.
From distributional perspective, the simplied assumption of closed capital account
i.e. capital can not move abroad if relaxed may drastically change the result. On the
other hand, capital mobility among industries in certain situation may also be imperfect.
Some portion of capital in every industry may be specic to that industry. This issues
need to be carefully considered in the more realistic model.
Commodities produced by certain industry, especially informal sector is very likely
to be much less tradable or highly dierentiated with the same product with foreign-
origin. This may also add more insight into the model. Generalization of Heckscher-
Ohlin model, for example in the form of non-tradability and product dierentiation may
change the well-accepted prediction8. In more realistic general equilibrium, together
with other factor such as the presence of intermediate goods and more disaggregated
industry, denitely need to be accounted for.
The relevance of the demand side of the pollution may need to be discussed if we want
to go beyond the question of distributional cost into more general welfare implication.
The complete picture of the distributional impact may also call for discussion of the so-
called optimum environmental policies. Technically, we can incorporate environmental
amenities into utility function and generate for instance the optimum pollution tax.
This, however, adds more technical complication because most environmental amenities
are non-marketed and raise a question of whether it can be represented in a standard
applied general market equilibrium analysis. However, alternatively we may also restrict
our analysis in the cost side only, and regards the need for environmental protection as
exogenous.
When moving into bigger applied general equilibrium we may need to reconcile the
theory and existing database. One example of the basic data issue is the industrial emis-
sion. Can we get such representative data from Indonesia? The facts is rms do pollute
and emit some quantity of dierent type of pollutants, but by how much? Most likely
8See for example, Falvey et al (1997).
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we won't have accurate data on pollution from every industry in disaggregated classi-
cation. most CGE models, however, make approximation, for example from the use of
energy input where we more probably can access the data. We may also use emission
intensity disaggregated by industry from other countries used in other researches.
We also may still be open to widen the type of environmental policy relevant for
Indonesia not only restrict on industrial pollution. Jha and Whalley (1999) for example
suggest that environmental regime in developing countries is not the same as those
of developed countries. Environmental problem related to natural resources such as
deforestation, land degradation, and over-shing may be more prevalent and relevant in
developing countries compared to air or water pollution.
Finally, because the focus is on distribution and may be extended to the impact on
poverty in particular, methodology to assess the distributional impact from CGE model
need to be carefully devised. Most existing CGE model that analyze distributional im-
pact of certain shocks use the concept of representative households i.e. a few household
categories and discusses the distribution among those representative households. This
method, however is insucient to picture the reality because it disregards the hetero-
geneity within each of the representative household and we could not compute accurately
standard indicator of poverty or inequality because we have no information of distribu-
tion within-household category. Two approaches that may improve the methodology
that is planned to be pursued in further research. First is remove the representative
households assumptions and instead integrate any number of households available in
the survey data into the CGE model, and secondly use a separate microsimulation sim-
ulation using household survey to conduct distribution and poverty analysis.
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